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On 6 July 2020, Juliette Rémond Tiedrez wrote a fantastic article on
Völkerrechtsblog titled Time for an Islamic legal scholar at the ICC? She suggested
that there should be an Islamic law expert (faqih) sitting as judge of the International
Criminal Court (‘ICC‘) based on a few reasons. First and foremost, the Islamic legal
tradition is widely used yet usually forgotten and not represented , thus raising
questions towards the ICC’s legitimacy as an ‘international’ court. She points out
how the Court has been citicized as a “mechanism of neo-colonialist policy used by
the west. Second, there are more Islam-related matters dealt with by the court. This
is tied to the third point, where Tiedrez noted that “Muslims cannot be judged by non-
Muslims according to Islamic law”.
The question of legitimacy is indeed an important reason. Other than the sources
cited by Rémond Tiedrez, former International Court of Justice (‘ICJ‘) Judge Awn Al-
Khasawneh lamented on how difficult it was to properly include Islamic law principles
as a judge at the ICJ. However, Islamic law principles do slip in sometimes: not just
in the Hostages Case as “legitimacy booster”, but also as basis of reasoning in the
Pulp Mills Case Oral Proceedings (CRT 2009/14). Recently, the International Law
Commission cited the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam 1990 as among
the world’s international human-rights instruments. It must also be noted that Al-
Khasawneh was optimistic that Islamic law can properly find a way to participate in
international law.
While Rémond Tiedrez’s proposition is very interesting,  I have difficulty finding a
basis for her statement that “Muslims cannot be judged by non-Muslims according
to Islamic law”. However, it is well established that Muslims may not judge with laws
other than what is revealed by Allah and His Messenger. There is a bulk of Islamic
scholarship from the first until today’s generation establishing this, stemming from
Quranic verses such as Surah Al-Ma’idah, 4: 44-47, and 50 and various others. As
extension of this, believing that other laws are better than what is revealed by Allah
is a nullifier of Islam. Moreover, to be considered as an apostate in Islamic law is not
merely by explicit self-disassociation with Islam, but also if they have committed acts
known as nawaqidul Islam/Iman (nullifiers of Islam/faith).
At face value, it would therefore seem ‘un-Islamic’ for an Islamic legal scholar to
sit as an ICC judge and apply the Rome Statute instead of Islamic law principles.
However, I find that there are two things that would ‘Islamically’ justify an Islamic
legal scholar as an ICC judge.
First,  from an Islamic standpoint the Islamic legal scholar would have to be truly
competent. He must be an expert and well-versed in the proper Islamic legal tradition
of the turath (classical Islamic scholarship by the ‘ulama throughout the ages) as
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opposed to the practice of most Muslim-majority nations. As Ahmad Al-Dawoody
notes (in context of the laws of war, but applying to most if not all cases): “…the
considerable westernization of the legal systems, except family law, of most Muslim
countries has largely alienated scholars of Islamic law from contributing to the
policies and positions of their governments, most noticeably on two of the areas
treated by their classical predecessors, that is, Islamic governance and Islamic
international law.”
The question of appointment is also important to consider as it relates to the correct
Islamic authority. In Islamic law, Qadis (judges) are appointed by the Muslim rulers in
their own jurisdiction. Article 36 of the Rome Statute seems to solve this even from
an Islamic standpoint, as judges are appointed by the Assembly of State Parties that
already includes various Muslim-majority states. However, to ensure the competence
of the appointed Islamic legal scholar, the involvement of the OIC and established
council of Islamic scholars (such as the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, the
Muslim World League, Majelis Ulama Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia’s Permanent
Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta) would be a good extra mile to take.
Second, there needs to be stronger consideration of the relation between fiqh al-
siyar (Islamic international law) and contemporary international law. Classical Islamic
scholars such as Al-Shaybani and Al-Fazari have considered pacts and reciprocity
as sources of Islamic international law, finding basis from them in the Qur’an and
Sunnah (thus does not fall under “laws other than what was revealed by Allah”).
Contemporary scholars such as Muhammad Hamidullah articulates this in a modern
context to more explicitly include international treaties and customary international
law. However, this still only reflects how the Islamic state responds to the ‘traditional
positivistic international law’.
On the other hand, the ICC is based on the Rome Statute which, in turn, is based
on the contemporary international lawmaking era which, in Catherine Brölmann’s
words, leads to the “emergence of a public dimension to the international legal
order.” She further describes this legal order as having “(…) rules with a statutory
function, above and beyond rules governing voluntary legal relations between equal
subjects”. Most especially, the Rome Statute is part of jus cogens, the highest norms
in international law to which no derogation can be made.
Some scholars such as Abdullahi An-Na’im seem to incline (or explicitly state) that
Islamic law must readily conform tothe purported ‘universality’ ofinternational law.
However, his methodology of a purported ‘Islamic reform’ has been rightly criticized
as contradicting fundamental Islamic teachings. I myself have criticized An-Na’im’s
method in the context of international human rights. This is already a problem
without mentioning the issue of “neo-colonialist policy”,which raises questions
towards the existence of true universality in international law. A very long debate
would follow from this. My position based on established Islamic teachings is that
subordinating Islamic law beneath other laws is beyond ‘unislamic’: it nulifies Islam.
Considering that Article 21 of the Rome Statute clearly treats any domestic legal
system as secondary, we find ourselves in a clash, not only of principles but also of
worldviews.
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However, there is a way around this. Such conflict may be resolved Islamically by
redefining what the ICC means to Muslims and putting it into its proper place. A
useful corridor to start with is to examine the Islamic requirements for a deed to be
accepted by Allah. As explained by Ibn Rajab Al-Hanbali, this requires that the deed
(a) has the correct intentions i.e. to worship Allah alone, and (b) is in conformity with
Allah’s law.
Requirement (a), which is a very essential element to start from, is fulfilled if the
scholar does not intend Islamic law to be secondary or even equal to the Rome
Statute. Rather, these non-Islamic laws are perceived as treaties, which, to the
extent that they do not contradict Islamic law, are Islamically binding. Therefore,
Article 21 would be understood to treat the Rome Statute as superior to domestic
law so long as this does not contradict true Islamic law, which is not seen as
‘domestic’ (state-made) law as it is perceived as divine.
This path is of course flawed for obligations under the Rome Statute that are
contradictory to Islamic law. This is where requirement (b) comes in. To what extent
is the Rome Statute (and international criminal law in general) compatible with
Islamic law? As far as they are compatible, there should be no problem. And this is
where Islamic legal scholars must step up their research.
Mohamed Elewa Badar has argued how the provisions of the Rome Statute are
largely consistent with Islamic law. While his contribution is much welcomed, it
cannot cover each provision extensively as a ‘mere’ journal article. It is essential to
conduct more comprehensive research. For example, do any of the crimes under
the material jurisdiction of the ICC fall under the Islamic hudood (fixed penalty in
the Qur’an and Sunnah)? If yes, the Islamic scholar must apply the hudood instead
of the Rome Statute, which is correct Islamically but not from the Rome Statute’s
perspective. If not, the Islamic scholar can treat the crimes as ta’zir (discretionary
punishments based on principles found in the Qur’an and Sunnah) and decide based
on the Rome Statute as manifestation of that ‘discretion’, which seems acceptable  in
the international criminal law context.
I have written elsewhere how a very general comparative study between Islamic
law and international humanitarian law seems to easily show compatibility, but a
more detailed observation would show a lot of issues needing (proper and honest)
reconciliation. This is not only relevant to the particular crimes committed in armed
conflict. Further, we need more detailed research in order to identify potential
clashes to resolve, highlight compatibilities and even possible synthetic structures.
Having all that said, I would consider the appointment of an Islamic legal scholar as
an ICC judge to be a step forward. From an Islamic standpoint such an appointment
runs the risk of fundamentally violating Islamic teachings. However, I see this
issue as an opportunity for further development in the Islamic world, especially its
scholarship, and how it should engage with the rest of the world.
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